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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to explain Euroskeptic attitudes by examining the relationship between
information and Euroskepticism and the role of Euroskepticism in the post-enlargement
integration debate. Drawing upon data from the Eurobarometer survey series and the European
Election Studies, this thesis tests the relationship between information and attitudes towards
membership, the direction of integration, and voting. This analysis concludes the roles of
knowledge and awareness have divergent influences on hard and soft Euroskepticism. While
increased knowledge increases support for membership in the EU, increased awareness decreases
support for the direction of integration. This conclusion suggests that knowledge initially informs
individuals of the benefits of being a member in the EU but greater awareness increases the
likelihood they will be a harsher critic of the way in which it is developing, necessitating further
examination of the role of the Euroskeptic movement in public opinion.
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Introduction
Does greater knowledge of the European Union influence individual preferences and
attitudes about the EU, its institutions, actors, and policies? More specifically, are those
―Euroskeptic‖ individuals who oppose the EU measurably more or less informed about that
which they profess to oppose? Are Euroskeptic individuals even actively aware of Europeanlevel politics, or are they expressing negative preferences on the basis of some other set of
(presumably national) cues? While the literature on European integration and voting in European
Parliament elections has focused on a wide range of factors explaining support for (and trust in)
the EU, research on Euroskeptic attitudes and preferences for avowedly Euroskeptic political
parties remains divided. It has, moreover, largely failed to fully explore the impact of
information on individual opinions. By exploring the relationship between knowledge, political
awareness, and Euroskepticism, this thesis tests two hypotheses: (1) as the level of knowledge
and awareness about EU institutions and politics increases, Euroskeptic attitudes toward
membership and the direction of the EU decrease and (2) as the level of EU awareness increases,
the likelihood of voting for Euroskeptic parties decreases.
Examining the independent effects of knowledge and awareness on attitudes toward the
direction of integration and membership and the impact of information on voting is important for
several reasons. First, breaking public opinion of the EU into two separate attitudes brings
attention to a new debate taking place in Europe post-enlargement. This thesis argues the debate
over membership (i.e. whether or not to join or remain members) has become less salient postenlargement in favor of a more specific debate on the prospects for further enlargement and
integration. The inclusion of a measurement for attitudes toward the direction of the EU is
necessary in order to distinguish between hard and soft Euroskeptics and observe the effects of
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information on both attitudes. Second, extending the analysis of Euroskepticism to test the link
between awareness and voting allows for an analysis of the impact of political parties and
campaigns. This thesis argues that while knowledge influences public opinion, the level of
information received prior to an election has a larger effect on how an individual will vote and
the issues they will view as important. The effects of knowledge and awareness may diverge
because of the different nature of the source of information. Knowledge of how the EU functions
and formulates policy is objective and is less likely to be manipulated by framing and cueing
from political elites. This knowledge increases the level of familiarity an individual has with the
EU and how it works. On the other hand, awareness measures the amount of information that an
individual receives and shares with others. This information comes from media sources and peer
groups and is much more likely to be subject to framing and bias. Information from the media
and political parties can highlight controversies and debates an individual was previously not
aware of, such as the consequences of enlargement for economic competition or national
identity.
This thesis seeks to fill a gap in our understanding of Euroskeptic attitudes by examining
the relationships between information and Euroskepticism in three ways. Drawing upon data
from the Eurobarometer survey series and the European Election Studies, this thesis will test the
relationship between attitudes towards membership, attitudes toward the direction of integration,
and the relationship between awareness and voting. Most empirical testing of Euroskepticism
and information to date has explored the relationship between information and sentiments
towards membership only (McLaren 2007; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998) and virtually no
research has been conducted on the role of individual characteristics in European elections. This
analysis contributes to our understanding of these relationships by concluding the roles of
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knowledge and awareness have divergent influences on hard and soft Euroskepticism. While
increased knowledge increases support for membership in the EU, increased awareness decreases
support for the direction of integration. This conclusion suggests that knowledge initially informs
individuals of the benefits of being a member in the EU but awareness increases the likelihood
they will be a harsher critic of the way in which it is developing.
Euroskepticism in Context
Euroskepticism and its impact on integration have also been the subjects of scholarly
debate for several decades. Both the appearance of different types of Euroskepticism and its role
in public opinion are discussed in several works (Gabel 1998; Taggart 1998; Janssen 1991;
McLaren 2007). ―Euroskepticism‖ as employed in this thesis is defined as qualified or
unqualified opposition to the process of integration. Different forms of Euroskepticism exist that
range from complete opposition to the idea of the EU to opposition to only a few parts or
processes of the EU (Taggart 1998). This difference between types of Euroskepticism is often
interpreted through the distinction of ―hard‖ and ―soft‖ Euroskeptics. Hard Euroskeptics hold
hard-line positions on all forms of European integration. They reject any idea of political or
economic integration in Europe. On the other hand, soft Euroskepticism often takes the shape of
opposition to specific policies or the deepening of integration (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004).
Single issue parties centered around direct opposition are considered hard Euroskeptics, whereas
even pro-EU parties can have some soft Euroskeptic views (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004). This
thesis seeks to explore Euroskepticism by incorporating measures for both types. Using data that
analyze the manifestos of the parties running in European Elections, Euroskepticism is quantified
through the coding of hostile statements to both the entire idea of Europe and to the deepening of
a range of policy areas in Europe (Euromanifestos 1979-2004). Euroskepticism in individuals is
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quantified through survey data that investigates attitudes toward both the value of membership in
the EU and the direction of integration.
Euroskepticism is a persistent issue in EU politics. Czech MEP Jan Zahradil estimates
that about 15-20% of the 785 MEPs in the Parliament are Euroskeptic, and this number is
expected to rise in the forthcoming 2009 election (CTK 2008). Two major party families in the
European Parliament are considered Euroskeptic, the Independence and Democracy group and
the Union for Europe of the Nations, along with several members from the European United left,
some Greens, and nearly all of the non-aligned members (see Figure 1 for distribution among
party families in the EP). Hostility to the EU in public opinion also measured around 15% in the
latest 2008 Eurobarometer survey, which indicated public discontent is again growing after a
slight decline in negative attitudes in 2006 and 2007 (Eurobarometer 70: see Figure 2), and
recent challenges facing the EU like the current financial crisis and the rejection of the Lisbon
Treaty have further tarnished the image of the EU in the eyes of some.
Understanding the relationship between Euroskepticism and knowledge may help in
determining the main causes of Euroskepticism and help evaluate alternative strategies for
ameliorating it as well. A lack of knowledge was blamed as a key reason for the failed
acceptance of the Lisbon Treaty by the people of Ireland. Following this rejection, a European
Commission report stated that over half of the respondents rejected the Lisbon Treaty due to a
―lack of understanding,‖ ―ignorance, and confusion‖ (Buchanan 2008). In order to educate
potential voters in the 2009 European Parliament elections, the EU is preparing to spend 17
million Euros on activities to publicize the elections across Europe. It hopes to use major media
outlets to promote the election and educate the European public on European issues and give
political parties a platform on which to campaign (Smyth 2009).
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Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty (ITS)
European People's Party and European Democrats (EPP-ED)
Party of European Socialists (PES)
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN)
Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)
European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)
Independence and Democracy (IND/DEM)
Non-attached (NI)
5% 3%2%
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3%

6%
35%
13%
28%

Source: BBC Guide to the European Parliament http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7824671.stm

Figure 1: Party Families in the European Parliament

Source: Eurobarometer 70: First Results http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_first_en.pdf pg 36

Figure 2: Opinion of Membership in the EU
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Euroskepticism and Integration
Euroskepticism in public opinion also has urgent implications for integration as the EU
seeks to move forward. The implications of anti-EU sentiment are explored through research on
the quality of democracy in the EU (Rohrschneider 2002; Karp et al. 2003), the nature of
Europeanization (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Checkel 2007), and the role of political contestation
in the integration process (Marks and Steenbergen 2004; van der Brug et al. 2007b). Qualifying
a lack of knowledge as the main reason for the failure of the latest national EU referendum
signifies a refusal by the European elite to consider the real power of public opinion. Implying
that lack of knowledge is the only reason the citizens of Ireland would reject the Lisbon Treaty
disregards other plausible reasons for the referendum’s failure. A large majority of the Irish
people may have been well informed, but remain unhappy about the direction integration would
proceed if the treaty was approved.
The role of public opinion and its impact on European politics has changed considerably
over the past few decades. From its inception, the EU has been a largely elite-driven process.
While public opinion has been measured since the early 1970s, it has not played a distinctive role
in political contestations (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Previous European elections were not
an accountability mechanism for politicians and policy making at the European level
(Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004). Most of the empirical analysis conducted following the
1994 and 1999 European elections determined these elections were second-order national
elections, where individuals often punished national politicians regardless of their stance on
European issues. These elections were neither a good indicator of public sentiment toward
Europe, nor were they used as a vehicle for parties and political groups to campaign on European
issues (van der Brug et al. 2007b). EU orientations contributed very little to the party choice in
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European elections because parties did not clearly differentiate their positions (van der Brug et
al. 2007a). Additionally, the European preferences of voters showed no discernable patterns
across parties or ideology, making it even more difficult to determine a Euroskeptic constituency
(Scheuer and van der Brug 2007). Analyses of these relationships following the 2004 election
have not been forthcoming, suggesting scholars are looking to alternative points of entry for
public opinion in the debate over Europe.
Scholars analyzing the impact of integration on national political contests also came up
empty handed (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Political parties have traditionally not used
European issues to gain support in domestic elections. There has been no clear choice between
different ―visions‖ for Europe among parties. Mainstream parties do not see it as advantageous to
debate European issues and instead these issues are left to the extremes, where smaller parties
attempt to capitalize on the new issues (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). In 1999, issues of
integration had not yet become urgent enough to bridge this gap, but a prominent theme
throughout these studies was the immense potential for their contestation. Van der Eijk and
Franklin (2004) coined the term ―sleeping giant‖ to represent the role of EU orientations in
national politics. They argued under certain conditions these orientations could push voters
towards new patterns of political behavior that could change the bases of mobilization in party
systems across Europe. The conditions predicting the polarization of EU orientations included
the mobilization of party elites around these new issues and the occurrence of external events
that would place the EU on national agendas. On the eve of the 2009 European Parliament
elections these conditions may very well be present, highlighting an imperative need to
understand how preferences for Europe are formed and voiced.
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The consequences of enlargement in 2004 may be the single event that has produced the
conditions where public support becomes paramount to the success of integration. Following the
preconditions for polarization set by van der Eijk and Franklin (2004), Hooghe and Marks (2009)
argue that political tensions are activating across Europe because these conditions have been met.
First, they argue the scope and depth of integration reduced national barriers, allowing mass
immigration and increased economic competition which placed the consequences of enlargement
on national political agendas. Second, these issues have become mobilized by political parties
and political entrepreneurs. It is this mobilization that can influence public opinion most. The
public does not induce the effect of enlargement from personal experience, but rather it needs to
be constructed. This construction is most influential in those people who do not have strong
prior attitudes or opinions or have little exposure to the EU. Hooghe and Marks argue that
political entrepreneurs are able to mobilize mass publics by providing this information and
constructing mass opinion. Priming, framing, and cueing become the primary methods of
construction for opinions about enlargement and the EU (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Because the
center right and center left parties have largely ignored European issues, the majority of debate
on integration is taking place outside of the center parties and being framed by parties in
opposition to Europe and the possibility of referenda increases the politicization of European
issues even more (Hooghe and Marks 2009).
The current constitutional treaty raises issues of integration that have yet to be subjected
to a public vote, with the exception of Ireland. Concerns stemming from enlargement and
integration are now more focused on how the future scope and direction of the EU will be
defined. Public opinion is becoming increasingly more important. Hooghe and Marks
conceptualize the entry of public opinion into the decision making arena as a brake on
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integration, arguing that integration has slowed not because the public has changed its mind
about Europe, but because ordinary citizens now have a voice. Nationalist parties have been able
to capture the minds of the public by bringing questions of integration out of the economic
sphere and placing them into a debate on national sovereignty and identity (Hooghe and Marks
2009). The process of integration is being stalled even further by the reluctance of elites to start,
and subsequently lose, this debate over integration. The elite maneuvering to sell the Lisbon
Treaty as a smaller and less consequential step in integration has highlighted its desire to keep
the treaty out of referenda. By requiring a referendum, the public becomes the decision making
body that can make or break the Lisbon Treaty, or at the least slow the process of integration
considerably. National governments in Europe are now fearful of referenda defeat and the
consequences of their European policies. They are now far more aware of the opportunities for
European issues to enter political contests than they were at the turn of the century (Hooghe and
Marks 2009). Instead of gauging public opinion on membership in the EU, it is now more
important to determine what influences opinion on way the EU is evolving and functioning.
Exploring the nature of European public opinion on issues of integration is no longer a
hypothetical study of the potential for public contestation, but a step towards understanding how
the future of Europe will be determined. Because Euroskeptic parties are facilitating the
politicization of European issues, understanding the potential influence they have on individuals
is essential. Hooghe and Marks (2009) highlight the opportunity these parties have to influence
public opinion by framing, cueing, and priming the information received by those with little
knowledge or little exposure to the EU. They argue several issues stemming from integration
have become contentious in national debates and many of these are also the explanatory factors
of much of the Euroskeptic literature. These include national identity, cognitive mobilization,
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and economic and utility evaluations. While there is much consensus on the impact of identity
and economics, the impact of knowledge and awareness is less clear. Several studies have
included knowledge as a factor in determining Euroskepticism, but have not yet addressed the
potential impact it has on different types of Euroskepticism (Gabel 1998; McLaren 2007, 2004,
2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Rohrschneider 2002; Anderson 1998; Inglehart 1970; Janssen
1991). A gap exists in the systematic testing of cognitive mobilization as a factor in both hard
and soft Euroskepticism and empirical tests of the influence of information post-enlargement are
scarce. While identity remains a large component of Euroskeptic examination, analysis of the
ability to influence public opinion through information is due. Drawing on literature exploring
the relationship between awareness and public opinion (Anderson 1998; Inglehart 1970; Janssen
1991; Zaller 1991) and the nature of Euroskeptic parties (Taggart 1998; McLaren 2007; Hix and
Lord 1997; van der Brug et al. 2007a), this thesis contributes to the understanding of
Euroskepticism by systematically testing the relationship of both knowledge and awareness for
both hard and soft Euroskepticism and extending the analysis of awareness to voting behavior in
European Parliament elections. In doing so, it provides insight into the role of information as a
resource for political mobilization for or against integration.
Knowledge, Awareness, and Public Opinion in the Integration Debate
The ability of an individual to translate his or her understanding of the political process of
integration and absorb information about the EU from political parties is the main interest of this
thesis. Cognitive mobilization refers to the ability of individuals to use their cognitive skills and
level of issue familiarity to develop opinions about complex political matters. Knowledge of EU
institutions is defined by the level of understanding individuals have with the institutions of the
EU, their structure, and functions. Political awareness is defined as the level of interest or
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exposure an individual has to information. Each factor plays a separate role, not only in the
formation of preferences, but also in an individual’s ability to process and be influenced by
information. It is necessary to test these relationships separately in order to account for the
difference between objective and subjective knowledge. Knowledge improves the level of factual
understanding an individual has about the EU. Knowledge can increase an individual’s ability to
evaluate the functioning of the EU properly and produce more substantiated opinions on issues
like democracy and economic competition. Awareness includes a measurement for the level of
information an individual receives and shares with others. This measurement does not account
for the actual level of factual understanding an individual has, but rather measures how much
information an individual receives from the media and peers. If information about the effects of
enlargement is being promoted mainly through Euroskeptic movements, awareness may be
expected to increase the level of familiarity an individual has or acquires on controversial issues.
Both knowledge and awareness contribute to formation of attitudes and opinions, but in different
ways.
Cognitive mobilization theory addresses the relationship between awareness and public
support for integration and incorporates level of knowledge into the structure of preference
formation. Cognitive mobilization, as conceptualized by Inglehart (1970), encompasses the
broad process of familiarization, acceptance, and processing of information related to a political
community. Applying his theory to public support for integration, Inglehart argues that forming
attitudes toward integration and support for a political community is a two-level process
(Inglehart 1970). On the first level, mobilization must occur for individuals to develop an
understanding of European integration. On the second level, the ability of an individual to
receive and understand information influences the direction of support for integration. Inglehart
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(1970) argues that a higher level of education and political skill will allow for an individual to
more accurately link information to support for integration. Therefore if the information received
supports integration, individuals should support integration or if this information is negative, an
individual should become more opposed. Inglehart continues to argue that because the majority
of information cast upon the public has been favorable, any type of information consumption
should produce favorable orientations to the integration (Inglehart 1970). Gabel (1998) also
argues that any information is positive because it increases familiarity with the EU. Breaking the
theory of cognitive mobilization into these two parts (Figure 3) clearly shows how both
knowledge and awareness might have independent effects on the level of support for integration.

Figure 3: Causal Path of Cognitive Mobilization and Integration Attitudes

Extending the analysis of awareness and public opinion beyond the scope of European
integration, scholars have determined that awareness is a driving force in the formation of public
opinion (Zaller 1991; Converse 1962; Mackuen 1984; Zaller 1987). Political awareness plays a
direct role in the formation of public opinion by influencing the way individuals receive and
process information. Like Inglehart, Zaller (1991) determined the reception of information and
its acceptance is a two-stage process. First, a person is exposed to information in the mass media

13

and then they determine if they will accept or resist the information. He argues that political
awareness directly affects both levels of information processing and the amount of influence this
information will have. People with high levels of political awareness are likely to be constrained
by pre-formed preferences and values when exposed to new information and are able to defend
their prior beliefs. People with low levels of awareness are highly unlikely to receive much new
information and remain isolated from attempts to change their opinion. Those in the middle
remain the most susceptible to new information and influence because they are aware of new
information but do not have sophisticated attitudes allowing them to resist new influences
(Converse 1962).
If this is true, awareness could play an important part in the public’s perception of
Europe. The argument that voters in Ireland were ignorant and confused may be solely the fault
of mixed messages in the media and the public debates over the Lisbon Treaty or they may be
indicative of the broad scale effect of a Euroskeptic movement on the public. The argument set
forth by Hooghe and Marks (2009) places the stalling of integration on the shoulders of a large
Euroskeptic movement that has been able to influence the public by politicizing the
consequences of enlargement. This argument draws strength from the fact that information is
most influential when knowledge and exposure are low. In fact, the majority of respondents in
the European Election Study of 2004 fell in the middle or low range (see Figure 4) suggesting
that there are very few individuals with enough awareness to resist messages about the EU and
integration. This highlights an enormous opportunity to disperse influential information to a
middle and low range population.
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Figure 4: Level of Awareness of European Voters
Contradictions exist in the analysis of knowledge in preference formation. The level of
skill an individual has in interpreting information is directly related to their ability to abstract and
understand complex issues like European integration. The conception of integration and its
implications may be too challenging for an average citizen to attempt to comprehend and
develop carefully scrutinized preferences (Janssen 1991). Anderson (1998) assumes that not
many people are well informed about the integration process and will fill gaps in their
knowledge by using proxies, like opinions about their national governments or parties, when
answering questions about the European integration process. He faults research on public
opinion and integration for assuming citizens have meaningful preferences for integration, that
they are economically rational, reasonably well informed, and able to perform complex
evaluations of the integration process. In reality, he argues, most public opinion data show that
people have very little knowledge about the EU and questions how individuals can be both
ignorant of European issues and rational in their evaluations of the personal benefits from
integration.
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Janssen (1991) empirically tested the link between changes in public opinion and the
level of knowledge of individuals. Janssen theorizes individuals who have a higher
understanding of ―what the EC is about‖ will have well thought out attitudes about integration
and answer questions about integration and their attitudes toward the EU consistently. His
research supports this conclusion and also finds that people with a higher level of understanding
to be more likely to view integration positively, thus supporting Inglehart’s theory. This suggests
that increased knowledge does drive support for integration but all scholars agree. Karp,
Banducci, and Bowler (2003) test the influence of knowledge on evaluations of democracy in the
EU. They argue that citizens who are more familiar with the EU will also be more likely to form
negative opinions because they are better prepared to evaluate how it functions. First they use
the democratic deficit hypothesis to argue that people who are more politically aware will know
that the EU parliament, and its relatively low level of control over policy, is not the democratic
equivalent to their own national parliament. They then argue that citizens who are more
politically aware will show greater concern over the lack of accountability and responsiveness in
the EU institutions. They find the evaluation of democracy declines as the level of knowledge
increases and the most knowledgeable people tend to be the most skeptical about democracy in
the EU (Karp et al. 2003).
Identifying the causal direction of the relationships between support and awareness and
knowledge provides the theoretical foundation for testing these relationships empirically. The
literature above suggests that some initial level of awareness is necessary for an individual to
form an opinion about the EU. Cognitive mobilization can be broken into these two
relationships, where awareness influences the receipt of information and its processing and
knowledge influences the way this information is evaluated and translated into attitudes.
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Because relatively little empirical consensus exists on the role of awareness and knowledge in
the formation of Euroskeptic attitudes, the first hypothesis of this thesis will test the roles of
knowledge and awareness in Euroskepticism to help further consensus. It will also seek to
differentiate the roles of information in hard Euroskeptic attitudes, and in the increasingly salient
soft Euroskeptic attitudes. Following from this literature, the first hypothesis argues that
increased knowledge will decrease the chances of Euroskeptic attitudes and will be tested using
the following:
H1: As the level of knowledge and awareness about EU institutions increases, the
likelihood of Euroskeptic attitudes towards membership decreases.
H2: As the level of knowledge and awareness about EU institutions increases, the
likelihood of Euroskeptic attitudes toward integration decreases.
In the literature above, Euroskeptic attitudes have been tested using cognitive mobilization but
include only a measure for membership. By including the measure of integration, this analysis
draws conclusions that can be extended beyond the first assessment of membership and begin to
shed light on newer forms of political contestation. An analysis incorporating new forms of
contestation is incomplete without also examining the role parties play in politicizing European
issues. If issues of integration are becoming more salient in public debate, the level of awareness
a European voter has towards the political debate between parties should influence the decisions
they make in voting. It is important to examine the structure and positions of parties in European
elections in order to determine how awareness impacts voting.
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Euroskepticism in European Party Systems
Political parties on the fringes have recently been given credit for stirring Euroskeptic
sentiment among the public (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Issue ownership of many contributing
factors to Euroskepticism like threats to national identity, economic competition, and increased
immigration has mainly resided in parties far from the center right or center left. The
unwillingness of mainstream parties to address problems stemming from an enlarged Europe has
largely marginalized the centrist view in public debate. Mainstream parties rarely find it
advantageous to debate integration issues. These parties are constrained by historical and
ideological roots which force them to incorporate new issues into their existing structures. This
often leads to discord among party members, which can confuse potential voters. Mainstream
parties are also much less likely to differ on issues of integration, so highlighting their position
also highlights the stance of other centrist parties (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe 2007). This
leaves very little room for centrist parties to campaign for or against European issues and leaves
the battlefield of European issues to parties on the fringe or traditional protest parties.
Parties on the far right or far left will use integration as an issue to gain public support for
three reasons. First, it is the consequences of integration that these parties are able to make
competitive issues with other parties and increase their popularity. Second, they are also able to
woo new voters without having to stray far from their ideological platform. They have more
credibility to actually make changes in national European policy because they are not held to the
same behavioral commitments mainstream parties have already made. Third, these parties can
bring these issues to debate without having to worry about the issues being politically divisive.
While traditional parties are grappling with enlargement issues as they come to the fore,
longtime Euroskeptic parties have had an established, party-wide anti-Europe stance for much
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longer (Hooghe and Marks 2009). After enlargement, we expect the increased saliency of these
issues to benefit the Euroskeptic parties at the polls because more voters are aware of not only
the issues but also the positions of these parties.
The distribution of Euroskeptic parties among the EU member states demonstrates the
variance in Euroskeptic positions and the difficulty of placing Euroskeptic parties into traditional
cleavage structures. In Western Europe, the mainstream parties are unlikely to publicly appear
Euroskeptic. With the exception of a few Christian Democrat and Conservative parties in
Euroskeptic parties are mostly far-right nationalist parties or far left communist parties on the
periphery or single issue parties. Table 1 describes the Euroskeptic parties that were able to gain
parliament seats in 2004 by party family and scale score for anti-EU positions.1 As this table
shows, it is not possible to distinguish Euroskepticism as a left-right ideological phenomenon
because opposition exists on both sides. Therefore it is difficult to remove the relationship
between Euroskepticism and vote choice from traditional determinants of vote choice such
partisanship, ideology, government evaluation (protest voting) (Taggart 1998). However, these
are the parties that are likely stirring controversy over integration post enlargement and their
effect on public opinion is important. In particular, many far right parties have been able to
capitalize on these issues in recent elections. The far right in Austria won nearly 30% of the vote
in September 2008 and credit was given to the strong stance they hold on immigration and the
protection of national identity (Iggulden 2008). Other far right parties in Europe that have been
able to increase success by campaigning on nationalist platforms include the Northern League in
Italy, the National Front in France, and the Flemish Block in Belgium (Ignazi 2006).
1

The scale score is taken from the coding of Anti or Pro EU positions in the Euromanifesto Data. Please see
variable coding in Appendix A for more information. This scale rates pro-EU parties as a 1 and Anti-EU parties as
10. All parties scoring above the median are included in this table. Also, Appendix A contains scale scores for all
parties each countries ballot in the 2004 European election and expands the list of Euroskeptic parties beyond those
elected to the Parliament.
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Table 1: Euroskeptic Parties in the European Parliament (2004)
Country
Austria
Belgium
Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia
Finland
France

Germany

Ireland
Italy

Luxembourg
Netherlands

Northern Ireland
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Sweden

United Kingdom

Party Name
Freedom Party
Social Democratic Party of Austria
Flemish Block
Communist Party of Bohemia and Monrovia
Political Movement Independents
Civic Democrat Party
Danish People's Party
People's Movement Against the EU
June Movement Against the Union
Estonian People's Union
Christian League of Finland
National Front
Movement for France
Rally for the Republic
Christian Social Union in Bavaria
Communist Party of Greece
Popular Orthodox Alarm
The Greens
Sinn Fein
National Alliance
Northern League
Communist Refoundation Party
Christian Social People's Party
Political Reform Party
Socialist Party
Democratic Unionist Party
Sinn Fein
Ulster Unionist Party
League of Polish Families
Self-Defense of the Polish Republic
Unitarian Democratic Coalition
Christian Democratic Movement
Greens
Junlistan
Left Party
Conservative Party
Green Party
Independence Party

Party Family
Liberal
Social Democrats
Regional
(Post)Communist
Special Interest
Liberal
Nationalist
Special Interest
Special Interest
Conservative
Christian Democrats
Nationalist
Conservative
Special Interest
Christian Democrats
(Post)Communist
Nationalist
Green Party
Special Interest
Nationalist
Nationalist
(Post)Communist
Christian Democrats
(Post)Communist
(Post)Communist
Regional
Special Interest
Regional
Nationalist
Conservative
(Post)Communist
Christian Democrats
Green Party
Special Interest
(Post)Communist
Conservative
Green Party
Special Interest

Scale Score
10
7
8
6
9
9
9
9
9
7
7
10
9
8
9
10
9
7
8
7
7
9
6
6
7
9
8
7
9
9
9
8
9
7
9
8
7
10

Euroskepticism manifests itself more publicly in the party systems of Central and Eastern
Europe and differences in the voting strategy of individuals between Western and Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) may exist. In CEE countries, several mainstream parties publicly voice
soft Euroskepticism. Hard Euroskeptic parties again remain on the periphery in the communist or
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far-right parties but are more abundant than in Western Europe. Euroskepticism in CEE is the
result of the increased salience of integration during the accession process (Taggart and
Szczerbiak 2004). Unlike Western Europe, it is expected integration will be a larger issue in
CEE, debated publicly in the party systems during the before and after the accession process.
This will affect the way individuals cast their votes and how this can be linked to
Euroskepticism. In Western Europe, it is more difficult to draw conclusions about
Euroskepticism from voting behavior than it is in CEE. In CEE, the expectation is that voting for
Euroskeptic parties is politically viable since Euroskepticism is distributed among many more
parties. This leads to an increased likelihood that citizens of CEE countries will cast votes for
parties higher on the integration scale utilized to classify parties in this thesis. In Western Europe
it is less likely even Euroskeptic individuals will cast a vote for a Euroskeptic party if the
electoral consequences are insignificant (i.e. it is less likely parties on the periphery will be
elected to office) and the number of parties is smaller. Considering this, the measurement for
vote choice is constructed to capture movement away from pro-EU parties as our independent
variables vary to estimate the effect of awareness on vote choice in the 2004 European
Parliament election2. Even though it may be difficult to disentangle the influence of
Euroskepticism on party vote choice, it is still important to examine the role they have in public
opinion.3
The power political parties and political entrepreneurs have to influence voters is most
important when examining voter behavior. If Euroskeptic political parties are doing the majority
of campaigning during European elections, it can be expected the information available to
2

The dependent variable is constructed to measure movement up the scale for party classification instead of simply
accounting for votes cast only for parties determined to be Euroskeptic. See Appendix B for more information.
3
For further discussion on the distribution among party families and for a larger classification of Euroskeptic parties
that includes parties not elected to the European parliament in 2004, see Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004 and Taggart
2008.
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individuals is framed for a specific purpose. Euroskeptic parties will attempt to raise issues like
immigration, trade policy, economic competition, and democratic representation in order to
elevate their position above the centrist parties. It can be assumed that the majority of
information being received from television, newspaper, websites, and possibly even peer groups
revolve around the current European debates, whether positive or negative. In the months leading
up to an election, it may be less likely that this information increases their factual knowledge of
the EU. It is much more likely they will receive information on controversial issues only.
Awareness then becomes the best measure for exposure to the EU, and its relationship to voting
holds more explanatory power for Euroskepticism. The relationship between awareness and vote
choice can be tested using survey data. In order to determine whether or not the relationship
between the salience of enlargement and integration issues and Euroskepticism exists, the
following hypothesis will be tested:
H3: As the level of EU awareness increases, the likelihood of voting for an anti-EU party
decreases.
Conceptualizing Euroskepticism on the individual level for voting and attitudes has
produced several explanations for an individual’s feelings about the EU that cannot be ignored.
Factors such as national identity, economic status, left-right ideology, and trust in government,
have been theorized as possible components of Euroskeptic attitudes in addition to the role of
information (Gabel 1998; McLaren 2007; Inglehart 1970; Hooghe 2007; Hooghe and Marks
2004; Janssen 1991; Rohrschneider 2002). Various combinations of these factors make up very
different kinds of Euroskeptics. Determining the roles that awareness and knowledge play on the
formation of attitudes cannot be accomplished without controlling for the independent effects of
values, ideology, and economic factors on the interpretation of information.
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Alternative Explanations for Euroskepticism
Several arguments also exist that claim individuals may have other characteristics and
values that pre-determine and solidify their attitudes toward integration. Gabel (1998) tested five
theories of Euroskepticism that included national identity, utilitarianism, cognitive ability and
political values, class partisanship, and political trust (Gabel 1998; McLaren 2007, 2004;
Anderson 1998; Rohrschneider 2002; Hooghe 2007; Hooghe and Marks 2004). In order to
distinguish the independent effects of awareness and knowledge, these factors must also be
addressed and controlled in the analysis.
Utilitarianism
European integration has long been examined as an economic endeavor and attitudes
towards Europe have largely been conceptualized as cost-benefit analysis of the economic utility
of membership. Utilitarian conceptualizations of Euroskepticism rest on the belief that different
socioeconomic levels will assess the value of integration differently. The effect of market
liberalization, the free movement of labor and goods, and the liberalization of capital markets
varies across occupations and education levels (Gabel 1998). Utility theories will predict a
positive relationship between the level of education and occupational skill level, along with
income, and proximity to border regions. Hooghe and Marks (2004) highlight the effect of
scarcity as a reason for Euroskepticism. Because the opening of markets will favor individuals
who own factors that are abundant in the economy, it will hurt those in possession of factors that
are relatively scarce (Stopler –Samuelson theorem). In wealthy states the abundant factor is
capital. Those individuals in management or professional occupations will benefit, while the
working class will see it as a threat to their well-being. It is expected unskilled workers or
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laborers will be more Euroskeptic and a negative relationship to exist between low occupational
skill level and support for integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004).
Political Trust
Political trust is often a factor in support for all governments. When it comes to
integration, it is expected that those individuals who do not trust their national governments will
be less likely to trust the institutions of the EU. Dissatisfaction with national government is
likely to be projected onto the EU (McLaren 2007). Instead of evaluating the idea of European
integration from a rational, cost-benefit point of view, individuals simply vote on their
preferences for domestic government (Anderson 1998). Because the functioning of the
institutions of the EU may be even harder to comprehend than national governments, individuals
may tend to be increasingly skeptical (McLaren 2007).
Identity
Integration can also be seen as a threat to national identity. Identity has been theorized
to be a mixture of different territorial identities that can either be exclusive or inclusive (Hooghe
and Marks 2004). Inclusive identities can be those where several different levels of identity are
mixed and a national and European identity are interwoven (Risse 2004). European identity can
also be an integral part of national identity, where national identity means in part to be European
(Kersbergen 2000). Exclusive identities are those in which European identity exists in conflict
with national identities. These identities are threatened by integration and it is expected
individuals who view their identity as solely national will be more Euroskeptic (Hooghe and
Marks 2004).
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All of the factors described above may play a connected role in determining an
individual’s preferences for European integration. If the levels of information and knowledge
influence the way information is received and accepted, then the personal values and
characteristics an individual holds may influence the type of information they receive. While
Inglehart (1970) argued that any exposure to European integration can be positive, the variation
in opinion of political parties and political elites must also contribute to the type of information
and the positive or negative effect it has on public opinion. Public opinion research has often
argued that voters develop their positions on policy by taking cues from their chosen political
party (Gabel and Scheve 2007).
Testing Knowledge and Awareness in Euroskepticism
Conflicting theories of Euroskepticism in individuals and in the party systems of Europe
make it hard to determine what makes an individual Euroskeptic. Are individuals really voting
for Euroskeptic parties because they hold Euroskeptic preferences? Are individuals aware of
their preferences for integration? Are these preferences represented in European elections? All
of these questions beg for a better understanding of the European voting behavior. This thesis
will first draw on data from Eurobarometer 68.1 (Papacotas 2007) to measure the actual level of
knowledge held by individuals who display Euroskeptic attitudes. It will also use data from the
2004 European Election survey (EES 2004) to indentify the distribution among parties and
utilize the elections survey to determine the level of awareness of each voter.
If the results of the hypotheses tests for H1 and H2 find in favor of these hypotheses, it
will support the literature on cognitive mobilization and political skill that favors the formation
of positive opinions towards the EU. If the results do not support H1 and H2, it could signify
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several more issues for investigation. If people are knowledgeable about the EU and still
opposed to integration, it could signify that EU information campaigns may not be the answer to
Euroskepticism and that the literature on the politicization of enlargement as a negative is more
powerful. It would suggest that knowledge may heighten the level of evaluation individuals have
for EU policy and that their evaluations are becoming increasingly negative post-enlargement. If
the results of the hypothesis test for H3 find evidence in favor of H3, it will support the literature
that claims all forms of information increase familiarity with the EU and in turn will be positive
influences. If the evidence is unable to conclude in favor of H3, then a conclusion that awareness
can hinder the integration process will be in order. If this is true, the claims of ignorance on
behalf of Euroskeptic voters will no longer be valid and the examination of the information
available to voters will be necessary. The role of Euroskeptic parties in the mobilization of these
issues will be increased. This conclusion will highlight the need to take a look at the role of
Euroskeptic parties in campaigns and elections.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables used to test H1 and H2 incorporate measures of support for
integration and the desired direction of integration, with the standard Eurobarometer questions,
―Generally speaking, do you think membership in the European Union is a: good thing, bad
thing, neither good nor bad and ―at the present time, would you say that, in general, things are
going in the right direction, wrong direction, or neither in the European Union.‖ The literature
that has previously tested the individual components of Euroskepticism has represented a variety
of measures for Euroskeptic attitudes. The question for attitude towards membership has been
the most prominent standalone measure for support for integration (Anderson 1998).
Euroskepticism has also been constructed using an index of attitudes toward the membership and
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direction (McLaren 2002) and combined with a question on the speed of integration (Hooghe and
Marks 2004). It is no longer valid to combine these measures as a test for Euroskepticism in light
of the recent push for further supranational integration. As the literature described above has
stated, the main issue facing the EU today is the direction of the EU’s future. Combining these
measures may lose some of the distinction between hard and soft Euroskepticism. By keeping
them separate, this thesis will be able to distinguish the effects of knowledge and awareness on
Euroskeptics that are wholly opposed to membership and those that are merely opposed to the
direction it is going. The ambiguity of the question utilized to measure this attitude leaves the
meaning of the ―right‖ and ―wrong‖ direction to the respondent. In doing so, the measurement
here makes no attempt to distinguish between different ideas of wrong. This measurement is
assumed to pick up on negative attitudes for all facets of opinion including those who view the
direction negatively because integration is going too far and those who have the same opinion
because it is not going far enough. In using this question, it is hoped all forms or soft
Euroskepticism are accounted for.
In order to test H3, the dependent variable will be constructed as an ordinal variable from
the European Election Study of 2004. The value for each vote will corresponded to the
placement of that party on a scale measuring pro and anti integration positions. This
categorization of Euroskeptic allows for all parties to be placed on a spectrum of pro-EU to AntiEU with a middle score of neutral (5). Instead of only identifying votes for those parties with a
high enough score to be considered Euroskeptic, this measure hopes to show the relationship
between awareness and the movement along this pro-anti EU scale. Electoral rules and different
party systems may influence the way in which voters cast their votes in elections. Using the scale
as a measurement is meant to account for those individuals who may strategically vote for a
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center party when Euroskeptic parties are not a viable alternative. It is assumed that even if a
hard-line Euroskeptic will not vote for a Euroskeptic party that has no viable chance for success,
he/she will also not vote for an intensely pro-EU party. This scale hopes to catch those votes in
the center and the movement between the likelihood of voting at each level when awareness
changes.
Independent Variables
Knowledge
The main independent variable to be tested for H1 and H2 is knowledge of the EU. This
variable will be constructed using several questions about the EU and parliament. The first sets
of questions are true or false:
The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the EU?
The European Parliament was created 50 years ago?
Any enlargement of the EU is subject to prior approval of the European Parliament?
The EU’s budget is determined jointly by the European Parliament and Member states?
The EU currently consists of 15 member states?
Every six months the presidency is given to a different member state?
The Euro area currently consists of 12 member states?

The next questions pertain to the date of the next European Parliament election (June 2009, 2007
for Romania): ―In your opinion, when will the next European elections be held, here in our
country? Year?‖ This combined measure is meant to replace a more commonly used measure of
self reported knowledge of the EU. While this measure is available in the survey, the option of
actually testing individual knowledge is uniquely available as well. These measures appear to be
similar with 35% of respondents scoring above the mean on the knowledge test and 40%
claiming to have an understanding of how the EU works.
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Awareness
Awareness will also be tested in H1 and H2 using the standard questions:
―When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently,
occasionally, or never. The main independent variable to be tested for H3 is also the level of
awareness of the European Election. This measure will be constructed using this five part
question addressing interest in the European election, ―how often did you do any of the following
during the three or four weeks before the European election?‖
…watch a program about the election on the television?
…read about the election in a newspaper?
…talk to friends or family about the election?
…attend a public meeting or rally about the election?
…look at a website concerned with the election?

Controlling for Alternative Explanations
According to the theoretical literature, controls will be added for national identity,
political trust, partisanship, and utilitarianism along with demographic controls.
Model for Voting
Controls will be added to the model for trust, national identity, partisanship, and utility.
The measure of trust will be constructed using an index of responses to the following question:
―Please tell me on a score of one through ten how much you personally trust each of these
institutions.‖
Country parliament?
The European Parliament?
The (Country) Government?
The European Commission?
The Council of Ministers?
In order to measure national identity, the following question will be used to code those
respondents with exclusive national identity: ―Do you ever think of yourself not as a (country)
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citizen but also as a citizen of the European Union?‖ The measure for partisanship will come
from a self reported measure for left/right political ideology using the following question: ―in
political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". What is your position? Please indicate
your views using any number on a 10-point-scale. On this scale, where 1 means "left" and 10
means "right," which number best describes your position?‖ In order to account for the role of
extreme ideologies, this variable will be recoded to distinguish voters on the fringes. Several
different measures of utility have been used to the relationship between economic utility and
support for integration. Egocentric utilitarianism measures economic utility using occupation,
income, and education along with questions regarding the perceived benefits from integration
(McLaren 2007, 2004; Gabel 1998). This thesis uses the question, ―over the next 12 months, how
do you think the general economic situation in this country will be?‖ The responses are on a
scale of one to five, five being get a lot worse and one being get a lot better. Other measures
included as controls will be a dichotomous measure for membership in a trade union
(occupation) and in the agricultural sector, last year of education completed, and the self reported
social class of each respondent.
Model for Preferences
The measure for trust will be constructed using the same format as the voting model. The
Eurobarometer supplies the same questions pertaining to trust. National identity will be
constructed with the same logic as identity in the voting model in order to account for exclusive
identities. It will combine a measure for attachment to one’s country and the EU to produce a
score that will be coded for exclusion or inclusion. The measure for partisanship will be
constructed the same as in the model for voting. The same question exists in the Eurobarometer
with the same scale. Those respondents who answered ―don’t know‖ or ―no answer‖ will be
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coded as missing. The Eurobarometer survey uses the same question about expectations as the
measure of utilitarianism in the voting model. This question will be used here along with the
demographic indicators of employment in a manual trade and level of education.
Methods
In order to test H 1 and H2, an ordered logit model is constructed to determine the
independent effect of knowledge and awareness on preferences for membership and integration.
In order to test H3, ordered logit regression analysis was used to test for the independent effect or
awareness on vote choice. The expectation is as the level of awareness increases, the likelihood
of casting a vote for a party higher on the pro and anti-EU scale will decrease. Ordered logit will
be used over OLS since these dependent variables are bounded, non-continuous variables. In
each model, the control variables will be included in order to control for alternative explanations.
By using these models, it is possible to misinterpret the effect of the variables due to fixed
country effects. Because the country of each respondent does have some effect on the values,
education, and information individuals will received (i.e. some countries by nature are more
Euroskeptic than others), this effect is controlled by using country dummy variables.
The definition of the dependent variable in the voting model, the identification of each
party on a pro-anti integration scale, could be problematic. Using a qualitative assessment of
party manifestos to transfer party position into a quantitative data set may lead to variation in the
coding of parties and statements. The coding of these statements is already done in the
Euromanifestos and precautions were taken to ensure standard coding across coders and
countries. In order to ensure that the scale scored used to categorize parties is the best measure of
party standing toward the EU, analysis of policy statements will be used to double check the

31

validity of a categorization (see Appendix). However, the score currently used is a scale
placement by the coder of the manifestos. Since the coders of the manifestos are political science
professionals in the country for which they are coding, they perhaps are able to offer the best
view of integration attitudes. As with any survey data, the effects of the question wording and
order effects and social desirability effects can contribute to inaccuracies in answers from the
respondents. It is likely that some respondents will not respond with their true opinions when
being interviewed by a member of the Eurobarometer or EES team. However, the large number
of observations should be able to mitigate this effect where it may occur. Another problematic
element of the construction of these tests is the potential endogeneity of the relationship. While
the literature suggests that knowledge and awareness affects opinions about the EU, it is hard to
protect against falsely identifying this relationship when it is really support for the EU that is
driving the accumulation of knowledge. Testing for causality is done by utilizing a modified
Granger test for casualty. This will be used in the model of preferences.
Results
Initial tests of the models of membership attitudes and direction show different effects for
knowledge and awareness. In the model testing the attitude toward membership, both knowledge
and awareness support the hypothesis and decrease the likelihood that respondents will view
membership negatively (Table 2). The control variables behave as expected with higher levels of
education and a positive economic outlook supporting a decrease in Euroskeptic attitudes toward
membership. More extreme identification for partisanship, as well as exclusive national identity
and identification with manual labor increase the likelihood that Euroskeptic attitudes toward
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membership are present. Trust was not significant in this model (at the α = .05 level), suggesting
that trust in government is a weaker factor in determining attitudes toward membership.4
Table 2: Results of Membership Model5

Knowledge
Awareness
Trust
Identity
Partisanship
EconOutlook
Manual
Education

Coef.
Std. Err. Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
-0.147
0.009
0.863
0.008 **
-0.140
0.025
0.869
0.022 **
0.014
0.008
1.015
0.008
0.737
0.037
2.090
0.077 **
0.065
0.032
1.067
0.034 *
-0.568
0.022
0.567
0.013 **
0.162
0.037
1.176
0.044 **
-0.309
0.020
0.734
0.014 **

*signifies significant at the α=0.05 level **signifies significant at the α=0.01 level

Upon further analysis, knowledge appears to have the largest effect in decreasing
Euroskeptic attitudes when awareness is held constant at the highest level (18).6 Here the
probability a respondent will view membership as a good thing is increased from 69% to 80% as
knowledge goes from 0 to 4 correct answers at the highest level of awareness. The percentage
does increase between the middle and highest levels but it is not as dramatic as the switch from
low to high levels (80% predicted probability to 88% when knowledge goes from 4 to 8 at the
highest level of awareness). Awareness has the largest effect when it is increase from mid-to
high levels and knowledge is held constant.7 We can conclude in favor of H1 and find in support

4

Trust is significant at the α = .10 level.
National fixed effects were controlled for in this model but not reported here. See Appendix C for full models.
Each model uses Netherlands as the base country and excludes it from the model. It found most countries
significantly different from the Netherlands. Including these fixed effects attempts to control for specific country
effects that may affect the view an individual has toward membership. The effects of the explanatory variables
remain significant with this inclusion.
6
The clarify function was used to test the strength of the effect of knowledge and awareness on membership varying
each level of awareness for each level of knowledge and allowing each control to remain at its central tendency
(Trust = mean of 10.8, Identity at mode of 1, Partisanship at mode of 0, Economic Outlook at mode of 3, Manual
Labor at mode of 0, and Education at mode of 2).
7
In order to account for potential interactive effects of knowledge and awareness on this dependent variable, a
model was constructed including an interactive term and reported the insignificance of term (α=.853).
5
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of the theoretical literature that argues knowledge and awareness have a positive effect on
attitudes toward the EU.
In the model testing attitudes toward direction, knowledge and awareness have divergent
effects. Knowledge is a significant negative factor in this model, signifying as knowledge
increases the likelihood of being skeptical of the direction of the EU decrease. Awareness is
found to be a significant and positive factor (Table 3). This implies as people become more
aware of the EU, they are more likely to see it going in the wrong direction.8 The control
variables also perform as expected in this model. Higher levels of trust and education as well as a
positive economic outlook decrease Euroskeptic attitudes and exclusive national identity and
manual labor identification increase these attitudes. Further analysis also supports this divergent
relationship.9 The probability of thinking the EU is going in the wrong direction increases at
every level of knowledge when it is held constant and awareness is changed. For example, when
knowledge is held constant at 4 the percent probability for a negative attitude increased one
percent at each level of awareness (11%, 12%, and 13%).10 The percent probability that a
respondent will have a positive view toward direction is high, but it is decreased as awareness
moves higher (71%, 69%, and 67%), showing that awareness does have a decreasing effect on
seeing the EU in the right direction. In this case, H2 is supported only for the relationship
between direction and knowledge.

8

The survey question utilized to construction the direction variable offers the choices: the EU is going in the right
direction the wrong direction, or neither. Please see variable description for more info.
9
The clarify function was also used to test the strength of the effect of knowledge and awareness on membership
varying each level of awareness for each level of knowledge and allowing each control to remain at its central
tendency (Trust = mean of 10.8, Identity at mode of 1, Partisanship at mode of 0, Economic Outlook at mode of 3,
Manual Labor at mode of 0, and Education at mode of 2).
10
The interaction between knowledge and awareness was also tested in an additional model. In this case the
combined effect was significant and positive, showing further support for the conclusion above.
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Table 3: Results of Direction Model11

Knowledge
Awareness
Trust
Identity
Partisanship
EconOutlook
Manual
Education

Coef.
Std. Err. Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
-0.120
0.009
0.887
0.008 **
0.049
0.025
1.050
0.026 *
-0.040
0.008
0.961
0.008 **
0.526
0.035
1.692
0.059 **
0.058
0.032
1.060
0.034
-0.712
0.022
0.491
0.011 **
0.019
0.038
1.019
0.038
-0.220
0.019
0.803
0.015 **

*signifies significant at the α=0.05 level **signifies significant at the α=0.01 level

The results for the voting model support the same relationship for awareness as the model
of direction. This model finds that awareness is significant and positively related to voting for a
party higher on the anti-EU scale (Table 4). This suggests that as awareness increases, votes for
parties that are Euro-neutral or Euroskeptic increase. Further analysis reveals that the behavior of
this variable is closely linked to trust.12 Analyzing predicted probabilities shows that when
awareness is increased, the probability of voting for parties that rank 1, 2,or 3 decreases and
parties ranking 4 or higher increase at low and mid levels of trust. For example, as awareness
increases from 7 to 10, the predicted probability of voting for a party ranked 3 decreases by 4%
while a party ranked 7 increases by 1%. The largest increase in predicted probabilities occurs in
parties between 4 and 6 which signify that Euro neutral parties also gain significantly from
increased awareness. The smallest increase in predicted probabilities occurs at high levels of
trust. The probability for voting for parties ranked 3 or greater is increased at high levels of trust

11

National fixed effects are included but not reported in this table. See footnote 3 and Appendix C.
The clarify function was also used to test the strength of awareness on party vote varying each level of awareness
for each level of trust and allowing each control to remain at its central tendency (Identity at mode of 0, Partisanship
at mode of 0, Economic Outlook at mode of 3, Union at mode of 0, Agriculture at mode of 0, Education at mean of
19.48, and Class at mode of 3). The control variables were also tested at varied levels and found to have a small
effect in change the predicted probabilities but not changing the overall pattern or increasing and decreasing
probabilities for party vote over changes in awareness and trust.
12
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and the expected probabilities change only slightly across all parties.13 In this model, H2 is
rejected in favor of an increasing relationship between awareness and the scale score of the party
an individual votes for.
Table 4: Results of Voting Model14
Coef.
Std. Err. Odds Ratio Std. Err.
Awareness
0.057
0.014
1.059
0.015 **
Trust
-0.028
0.003
0.972
0.003 **
Identity
0.160
0.057
1.174
0.066 **
Partisanship
0.156
0.051
1.168
0.060 **
EconOutlook
0.088
0.029
1.092
0.031 **
Union
-0.010
0.054
0.990
0.054
Agriculture
-0.191
0.116
0.826
0.096
Education
-0.012
0.005
0.988
0.005 *
Class
-0.142
0.027
0.868
0.024 **
*signifies significant at the α=0.05 level **signifies significant at the α=0.01 level

The relationships in the attitudinal models required testing for endogeneity. While this
thesis explores the effect knowledge has on membership attitudes and attitudes toward the
direction of integration, it is also plausible that positive or negative sentiments for both
membership and direction may motivate an individual to seek higher levels of knowledge and
awareness. In order to test the casual relationship between these variables, a simulated Granger
test was conducted but reversing the dependent and independent effects for the attitude models.
A model with knowledge as the dependent variable and membership and awareness as the main
explanatory variables shows that sentiments toward membership are significant and positive in
determining levels of knowledge. This relationship was similar when awareness was a dependent

13

The interaction between trust and awareness was tested in an additional model and was insignificant (α= .164).
National fixed effects were controlled for in this model. Please see Appendix C for the full report. This model
reported the significance for most countries, which is expected given different electoral and party systems and
cultures. With these effects included, awareness remains significant. The strongest effects came from countries
where the majority of votes were placed for parties ranking above 5. Similar to the other models, this model uses the
Netherlands as the base country and excludes it from the model.
14
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variable and knowledge independent but the direction was negative. For the direction model,
direction was significant but negative when knowledge was a dependent variable. This suggests
that preference for the direction of integration actually reduced the level of knowledge that
people have. With awareness, direction was a significant and positive factor only a 95%
confidence level but not at a 99%. This suggests that higher animosity toward the direction of the
EU increases awareness. Simulating the Granger test show that the causal direction of these
models is bilateral and perhaps there is some sort of feedback taking place between the variables.
Implications
Several conclusions with important implications can be derived from these findings. The
implication and conclusions will first be addressed in relation to the theoretical literature on
knowledge and Euroskepticism, then its implications for the integration debate will be
incorporated, followed by a recommendation for further exploration. The hypotheses of this
thesis have mixed results. H1 is supported in its entirety. Increases in knowledge and awareness
appear to decrease the tendency to hold negative attitudes toward membership in the EU. H2
must be split into two separate parts. First, the test of knowledge and direction confirms the
hypothesis. An increase in the level of knowledge does decreases the likelihood of holding a
negative attitude toward the direction the EU is going. Second, the test of awareness and
direction does not support the hypothesis. As awareness increases, the tendency to view the
direction of integration negatively increases. H3 is not supported. The relationship between
awareness and vote choice appears to be positive and increases the chances of voting for a party
ranked higher on the integration scale. These findings imply knowledge and awareness function
differently, even though they may not be mutually exclusive. Overlap exists when
conceptualizing awareness and knowledge. Higher awareness can certainly lead to increased
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objective knowledge, but there is no guarantee. Concurrent with these findings, it is expected to
play a distinctly different role when information is constructed for a specific purpose. Linking
these findings to the theoretical literature further explains this relationship.
Interpreting these results in light of the literature offers several important conclusions.
The literature on cognitive mobilization and political acceptance is supported by these findings
(Zaller1990, Inglehart 1970, Anderson 1998). Increasing knowledge increases familiarity with
the EU and makes individuals more open to new ideas. This is also supported in the evaluation of
knowledge and direction of the EU. The higher level of understanding individuals have on the
way the EU works, the more approving they tend to be. This differs slightly from Karp,
Banducci, and Bowler (2007) who find that an increase in knowledge leads individuals to
evaluate the functioning EU with greater skepticism, but these studies are not immediately
comparable. Evaluations of democracy do not correspond necessarily to evaluation of the
benefits of membership or integration. This type of evaluation is highly sophisticated and the
authors admit these types of evaluations only occur with high levels of knowledge. In order to
contradict Karp et. al., further analysis of these relationships at only high levels of knowledge is
necessary.
The role of awareness in this study diverges from the literature. While in the case of
membership attitudes, awareness follows the classic theoretical pattern of increasing positive
attitudes (Inglehart 1970, Anderson 1998), but this can no longer be said for attitudes toward
direction. It appears from these models that awareness and knowledge play two separate roles.
When individuals evaluate the benefits of membership in the EU, their knowledge and level of
awareness predict they will evaluate membership positively with higher levels of cognitive
mobilization. This is somewhat expected, but the large debate over membership has been
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replaced with a more complex debate on how and if the EU should continue to expand. In the
post-enlargement EU, the most important issues for debate revolve around how to handle the
consequences of enlargement like increased immigration and economic competition. These
issues are more susceptible to deliberate and purposive interpretation by groups seeking to
promote political goals. Assessment of attitudes toward enlargement and further integration are
best measured using questions about the direction of the EU and this is where the most
divergence with the literature is found.
Awareness appears to increase the probability individuals will evaluate integration in the
EU more skeptically. In both the model of direction attitudes and the voting model, awareness
has a significant and positive relationship. Although cognitive mobilization is more likely to
increase positive attitudes toward membership, increased awareness is just as likely to decrease
positive assessments of the direction of integration. This conclusion supports the theoretical
position of Hooghe and Marks (2009). They argue the largest debates are being cued, primed,
and framed by Euroskeptic parties and movements, raising awareness of the new challenges of
integration for the public. Public opinion is becoming more apprehensive in its support for the
constitutional measures and furthering integration. By framing the Lisbon Treaty in terms of
decreasing national sovereignty and attacking a national identity, anti-EU movements have been
able to influence the attitudes held by the public. What the findings in this thesis support is a
reevaluation of the link between information and preference formation. Instead of blaming
referenda failure on the ignorance and confusion of the public, it may be more important to look
at who is steering public debate and what information is being given to individuals when they
read a newspaper, watch television, listen to the radio, or talk among their peer groups. In order
to combat the negative effect of increased awareness, pro-EU groups must become more
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mobilized and enter the debate over integration to match the skeptic movements. In addition to
increasing the factual information available to the public about the EU, groups must mobilize in
favor of the EU initiatives. The domination of debate thus far by skeptic groups have produced
and controlled the relationship between integration attitudes and awareness shown here. The
benefits of enlargement need to be championed by pro-EU group and socialized into public
opinion in order to mobilize individuals around positive outcomes.
The performance of the control variables also impacts the strength of the conclusions
made here. Nearly all of the control variables were found to be significant and behave in the
theoretically expected way. Preferences for integration are obviously determined through a
bundle of many different influences. Economic influence, identity, and trust all contribute to the
formation of preferences along with information. This suggests that given the right conditions,
mass Euroskeptic movements can effectively and strategically pinpoint the most pressing and
controversial issues in public debate. By highlighting the consequences of enlargement as threats
to identity and the economy, Euroskeptic movements are able to raise awareness of the
contentious issues in the public that are very much a part of how they will determine their
preferences for the future of the EU.
Ignorant and Confused in Ireland?

A preliminary examination of the Irish citizens voting for the Lisbon referendum
highlights an opportunity to apply these findings. After the referendum failed, several political
leaders and the European commission scrambled to explain the public rejection of the new
treaty. The European Commission concluded that over half of the respondents rejected the
Lisbon Treaty due to a ―lack of understanding,‖ ―ignorance, and confusion‖ (Buchanan 20). The
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Eurobarometer Post-Referendum survey offers insight into these statements and the relationship
between knowledge, awareness, and voting and Irish citizens (Flash Eurobarometer 245). While
the data for the survey are not yet available to the public, the preliminary results reports can be
interpreted and compared to the results found here.

Lack of knowledge appears to a play an important role in the decision to participate in the
vote and in the voting decision, but it deserves a closer look. From the reports, it is evident that
78% of respondents could provide a legitimate reason for voting against the referendum. In fact,
knowledge appears to play its most important role in the decision to vote. The top three reasons
for abstaining from the vote were a lack of understanding of the treaty, a lack of information on
the issues, and a lack of information on the content of the treaty. Of those that did vote, reasons
for voting no include protecting the Irish identity, protesting against a united Europe or the EU
decision making process, to protect Irish military neutrality, and protect the tax system, as well
as a self reported lack of information (22%). Lack of information was the modal category for
respondents that voted no, but further questions reveal that lack of information does not translate
directly to ignorance and confusion. In addition to these reasons for voting no, the survey also
explores the knowledge voters have of the possible consequences of the rejection of the treaty.
When asked series of questions related to the outcome, only 17% of no voters claimed to be
unaware of the implications of the treaty’s rejection. 14% of yes voters made the same claim.

The majority of voters appeared able to make judgments about the future of Ireland and
the EU following the referendum. 76% of those voting no thought it would enable Ireland to
negotiate exceptions in the treaty compared to 38% of those voting yes. These results suggest
that those voting no were aware, at least marginally, of the way the EU works and what the treaty
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could mean for the Irish people. As far as membership goes, nearly all voters did not see this
referendum as a signal that Ireland is on its way out of the EU, which supports the conclusion of
this thesis, that knowledge influences positive attitudes towards membership. 89% of all voters
(98% yes and 80% no) still supported membership in the EU (European Commission 2008).
These results show that while the voters may have had a lack of information about the treaty,
they were neither confused nor ignorant of what it meant for Ireland. This signals that the public
did consume some information about the treaty, but it may not have been the information the
commission considers vital to the treaty’s understanding. Likewise, the benefits of the treaty may
not have been clear in the messaging coming from Lisbon supporters. It is clear that the Irish
people had legitimate reasons for rejecting the treaty and have established opinions about its role
in Irish society and government. This suggests that even though the treaty itself may not have
been understood, citizens did possess information on its implications. Examining the role of the
campaigns for and against the treaty provides preliminary insight into how information may
influence vote choice.

Table 5: Survey of Irish Voters

Flash Eurobarometer 245
Important Issues in Survey
(N=2000)
Unaware of implications
Vote will enable treaty exceptions
Ireland leaving EU (not believing)
―No‖ campaign more effective
Changed mind in campaign
Decision in last week

Vote Choice
No
Yes
17%
14%
76%
38%
80%
98%
81%
57%
72%
64%
57%
52%
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Analysis of the level of information and the effectiveness of the campaigns provides
insight into the role of campaigns and awareness in determining vote choice. The single most
important determinant of voting preference for the referendum appears to be the effectiveness of
the campaigns for or against it. This supports the conclusion that awareness has the potential to
affect voter preferences and shape public opinion. The respondents to the post-referendum
survey overwhelming concluded that the no campaign was the most effective. 68% of all voters
claimed the no campaign was most effective, with only 15% of all voters giving the same
distinction to the yes campaign. This means that even 57% of those who voted yes to the
referendum still thought the no campaign was more convincing for voters. Another interesting
aspect of these campaigns is that they appear to be most effective in the final days before the
referendum. The majority of all voters made their decisions in the final week of campaigning
(55%), compared to only 19% that had made a decision at the start of the campaigns.
Furthermore, 72% of those surveyed and voting no changed their minds in during the
campaigns (European Commission 2008). While the information is not available to measure how
many changed their minds from yes to no, this data adds more support to the conclusion that
awareness of the debate was a crucial factor in constructing the rejection of the treaty. This
supports the idea that the information received by voters during the campaign was influential and
more powerful when it was coming from Euroskeptics. While the measures of awareness used to
model this relationship are unavailable at this time, it appears that Irish voters have demonstrated
the relationships and conclusions set forth in this thesis.
It cannot be concluded that Irish voters were ―ignorant and confused‖ when voting for the
referendum in 2008. A preliminary look at the post referendum survey highlights the ability of
the Irish to justify their votes using valid reasons and understand the meaning and implications of
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their votes; those who where ―ignorant and confused‖ appear to be mainly those who abstained
from voting entirely. The campaigns launched against the referendum appear most effective,
supporting the idea that Euroskeptic groups and parties are more effective at raising awareness of
the issues (Hooghe and Marks 2009). Further analysis of the Irish case once data become
available will allow this relationship to be explored further.

Conclusion
In the future, the impact of awareness and knowledge on public opinion of the EU cannot
be ignored. As Europeans prepare to go to the polls for the European Parliament one more time
in 2009 and the Lisbon Treaty gears up for a second chance in Ireland, the level of information
the public receives is important. Information plays an important role in the formation of attitudes
and preferences for integration. Knowledge of the European Union and its functions and
structure increase the level of familiarity and decrease negative attitudes toward the EU and its
direction. On the other hand, awareness decreases these attitudes, suggesting the power of
information to shape public opinion. The contradictory influences of these two explanatory
variables highlights the distinction between information that increases factual knowledge and
information that expresses an opinion or highlights a controversy. Information can be framed and
constructed to inform public opinion for a specific purpose.
Information sources and the level of mobilization against integration require a closer
look. Euroskeptic campaigns were able to persuade Irish voter to reject the Lisbon Treaty. The
opportunity for Euroskeptic parties to gain control of the public debate over integration will only
grow if centrist parties do not begin to take public opinion serious. Euroskeptics are not confused
or ignorant; they are becoming more aware of the consequences of enlargement and further
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integration. This leads to another very important question that must be analyzed empirically:
what kind of information is being received and who is it coming from? Measuring the amount of
information an individual receives and shares with others is an important first step in examining
this relationship, but further analysis into the source of information will provide even more
insight into the link between information and Euroskepticism. If the EU seeks to combat the
skepticism coming from the far right and far left movements in Europe, it must incorporate the
debate over integration into its agenda and mobilization public opinion in its favor. If
mainstream parties continue to ignore the debate on integration they will undoubtedly drive
voters to parties that offer alternatives to the full-speed forward integration policies of the past
decade. Further research into the level of information and its source is necessary in order to
determine the potential awareness has to influence public opinion. In order to steer public
opinion away from Euroskepticism, pro-integration movements must be able to match this
movement in strength and distribution.
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APPENDIX A: EUROPEAN PARTY CLASSIFICATION
PARTY
AUT: FPO Fre
AUT: GA Gree
AUT: HPM, Li
AUT: LINKE
AUT: OVP Chr
AUT: SPO Soc
BEL: CD&V: f
BEL: CDH
BEL: Ecolo F
BEL: FN Nati
BEL: Groen!:
BEL: MR Mouv
BEL: NVA: fo
BEL: PS Fran
BEL: SP Flem
BEL: Spirit
BEL: VB Flem
BEL: VLD: fo
CYP: AKEL
CYP: DIKO
CYP: DISY
CYP: KISOS
CYP: KOP
CZR: CSSD Cz
CZR: KDU-CSL
CZR: KSCM Co
CZR: NEZ Pol
CZR: ODO Civ
CZR: SN-ED A
CZR: US/LRS/
DEN: DF Dani
DEN: FB Peop
DEN: JB June
DEN: KF Cons
DEN: RV Radi
DEN: SD Soci
DEN: SF Soci
DEN: V Liber
Doppelt, fäl
EST. ResP Re
EST: ER Esto
EST: K Centr
EST: Rahvali
EST:IL Party
EST:SDE Peop

EU
10
2
1
10
2
7
2
2
2
5
2
5
4
2
3
3
8
3
4
3
2
3
4
1
3
6
9
9
3
3
9
9
9
2
3
2
3
2
2
3
5
4
7
5
2

PARTY
FIN: KD (for
FIN: KK Nati
FIN: RKP SFP
FIN: SK Finn
FIN: SSDP So
FIN: VL Gree
FIN: VL Left
FRA: CPNT Hu
FRA: Diversi
FRA: EDE Eur
FRA: FN Nati
FRA: Greens
FRA: HZ
FRA: L`ouest
FRA: La terr
FRA: LO Work
FRA: MPF Mou
FRA: Nouvell
FRA: Parti d
FRA: Parti d
FRA: PCF Com
FRA: PS Soci
FRA: RPF Ral
FRA: RPR/DL
FRA: UDF
FRA: UFCN
GER: Allianc
GER: CDU Chr
GER: CSU Chr
GER: FDP Fre
GER: PDS Par
GER: REP The
GER: SPD Soc
GRE: DPE Dem
GRE: KKE Com
GRE: LAOS: L
GRE: ND New
GRE: PASOK S
GRE: SYN Coa
HUN: FIDESZ
HUN: MDF Dem
HUN: MSZP Hu
HUN: SZDSZ A

EU
7
3
2
2
2
3
3
8
3
3
10
2
5
3

9
2
10
4
3
2
8
2
2
3
3
5
9
4
2
10
3
2
10
9
1
1
4
1
1
1
2

PARTY
IRE: Fianna
IRE: Fine Ga
IRE: Greens
IRE: LP Labo
IRE: Sinn Fe
ITA: AN Nati
ITA: DS/SDI/
ITA: Fed.V:
ITA: FI Forz
ITA: Lista p
ITA: LN Nort
ITA: Patto S
ITA: PdCI Co
ITA: PR Radi
ITA: RC New
ITA: SVP Sou
ITA: UD.EUR
ITA: UDC
ITA: Ulivo
ITA:S.C.D.P.
LAT: :PP Lat
LAT: JL New
LAT: LC Latv
LAT: PCTVL F
LAT: TB/LNNK
LAT: TP Peop
LAT: ZZS Gre
LIT: DP Darb
LIT: KKSS
LIT: LCS Lib
LIT: LDP Lib
LIT: LKD Lit
LIT: LLRA/LR
LIT: LSDP Li
LIT: NS New
LIT: VNDPS V
LIT:TS-LK Ho
LUX: ADR Pen
LUX: Dei Gre
LUX: PCS CSV
LUX: PD DP D
LUX: POSL LS
MAL: MLP Par
MAL: PN Part

EU
3
5
7
4
8
7
1
2
2
2
7
4
4
1
9
1
3
1
3
4
3
3
4
4
3
5
5
5
2
2
3
4
4
2
3
3
1
3
6
2
3
3
2

PARTY
NET: CDA Chr
NET: CU/SGP:
NET: D 66 Li
NET: EuroTra
NET: GL Gree
NET: Lijst P
NET: PvdA La
NET: SP Soci
NET: VVD Lib
N-IRE: DUP D
N-IRE: SDLP
N-IRE: SF Si
N-IRE: UUP
POL: LPR lea
POL: PiS Law
POL: PO Citi
POL: PSL Pol
POL: SdPI Po
POL: SLD-UP
POL: SO Self
POL: UW Free
POR: B.E. Bl
POR: CDU: Co
POR: PSD-PP:
POR: PSP Soc
SK: ANO New
SK: HZDSMov
SK: KDH Chri
SK: KSS Slov
SK: SDKU Slo
SK: SDL Part
SK: SF: Free
SK: Smer Par
SK: SMK Part
SL: LDS Libe
SL: NSi New
SL: SLD+SKD
SL: ZLSD Uni
SL:SDS Slove

EU
2
6
2
3
2
9
3
7
2
9
2
8
7
9
5
2
4
3
2
9
1
5
9
4
2
5
3
8
8
4
2
5
3
3
1
1
3
1
1

PARTY
SPA: AP,PP C
SPA: CC Cana
SPA: CiU Con
SPA: Coalici
SPA: Coalici
SPA: EA Basq
SPA: EH Eusk
SPA: ERC Cat
SPA:GALEUSC
SPA: IU: for
SPA: Los Ver
SPA: PNV EAJ
SPA: PSOE So
SWE: Center
SWE: FP Libe
SWE: Greens
SWE: Junilis
SWE: KdS Chr
SWE: MSPCon
SWE: SdaP So
SWE: pComm
UK: Conserva
UK: Greens
UK: Labour
UK: LDP Libe
UK: PC Plaid
UK: RespectUK: SNP Scot
UK: UK Indep

EU
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
7
2
9
7
4
3
5
9
8
7
4
4
3
4
4
10

Party coding: each party is given a score on a scale of 1-10. A score of 1 represents a pro-EU
designation for the party. A score of 10 represents an anti-EU designation for the party. The scale
is taking from the Euromanifestos 2004 data and is determined by the designated coding
specialist for each country after the party manifestos have been coded.
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APPENDIX B: VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable used to test H1 and H2 are constructed using standard Eurobarometer
questions.
Membership: ―Generally speaking, do you think membership in the European Union is a: good
thing, bad thing, neither good nor bad, don’t know.‖
Direction: ―at the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right
direction, wrong direction, or neither in the European Union.‖
The literature that has previously tested the individual components of Euroskepticism has
represented a variety of measures for Euroskeptic attitudes. The question for attitude towards
membership has been used as a standalone measure for support for integration (Anderson 1998).
Euroskepticism has also been constructed using an index of attitudes toward the membership and
direction (McLaren 2002) and combined with a question on the speed of integration (Hooghe and
Marks 2004). Due to the structure of this particular Eurobarometer, the speed of integration will
be excluded from this measure. The values of good, bad, or neither, and right, wrong, or neither
were coded as one, two, three respectively. Values for the ―do not know‖ answer (4) are coded as
missing values without losing a significant portion of observations. The values for ―neither‖ are
changed to a value of 1.5. It is assumed that individuals that believe membership is neither a
good nor a bad thing, or the direction of the EU is neither good nor bad, do not have an opinion
either way. It is reasonable to assume they are somewhere between bad and good; therefore,
these values were re-coded to fall between bad and good. For each question a value of 2 signifies
Euroskeptic attitudes and 1 is more Europositive.
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Independent Variables
Awareness
Awareness in the attitude models is also be tested using the standard questions:
―When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently,
occasionally, or never?‖
Response will be coded 1 for never, 2 for occasionally, and 3 for frequently. Those responses of
don’t know or no answer will be coded as missing.

Awareness in the voting model constructed using this five part question addressing interest in the
European election, ―how often did you do any of the following during the three or four weeks
before the European election?‖
…watch a program about the election on the television?
…read about the election in a newspaper?
…talk to friends or family about the election?
…attend a public meeting or rally about the election?
…look at a website concerned with the election?

The responses were coded one for often, two for sometimes, and three for never, but were coded
again so that never =1, sometimes =2 and often =3 in order to construct the measure to be
positively increasing. Values of ―don’t know‖ or ―no answer‖ are coded as missing. The
responses to all questions are added to create an awareness score ranging from five to fifteen,
five being least aware and fifteen being most aware with a mean of 7.65.
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Knowledge
This variable is constructed using several questions about the EU and parliament. The first sets
of questions are true or false:
The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the EU?
The European Parliament was created 50 years ago?
Any enlargement of the EU is subject to prior approval of the European Parliament?
The EU’s budget is determined jointly by the European Parliament and Member states?
The EU currently consists of 15 member states?
Every six months the presidency is given to a different member state?
The Euro area currently consists of 12 member states?

The next questions pertain to the date of the next European Parliament election (June 2009, 2007
for Romania):
―In your opinion, when will the next European elections be held, here in our country?‖
Year?

Only year is used for this measure due to the variability of the actual date of elections across
countries. Each correct answer has been coded as one and each incorrect answer will be zero.
Answer coded don’t know have been coded again as zero. This is reasonable to assume that
respondents who answered ―don’t know‖ do not have the correct answer and did not choose to
respond with a specific choice. All scores are added to create a total score ranging from zero for
no correct answers to 8 for all correct answers and a mean score of 3.69. This measure is meant
to replace a more commonly used measure of self reported knowledge of the EU. While this
measure is available in the survey, the option of actually testing ones knowledge is uniquely
available as well. These measures appear to be similar with 9,557 respondents scoring near the
mean (3 or 4) on the knowledge test and 10,798 (26, 768 total) claiming to have an
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understanding of how the EU works. This measure was also tested for reliability with a score of
α = .6212 which was considerable higher than the reliability of combining the measures.
Control Variables in Model for Attitudes
Trust
The following Eurobarometer questions are used for this variable: The measure of trust is
constructed using an index of responses to the following question: ―Please tell me on a score of
one through ten how much you personally trust each of these institutions.‖
The (Country) Government?
Country Parliament?
The European Union?
The European Parliament?
The European Commission?
The Council of Ministers?

Respondents are given the options of tend to trust (1), tend not to trust (2), and don’t know (3).
The coding of these responses is reversed so that trusting is coded three and not trusting is coded
1. Answers of don’t know are coded as neutral (2) in order to keep substantial numbers of
observations in the data set. All responses are indexed to form the variable trust with possible
values from six for not trusting any institutions to eighteen for fully trusting.
National Identity
This variable uses the following question, ―People may feel different levels of attachment to their
village, town or city, to their country or to the European Union. Please tell me how attached you
feel to…
Your country?
The European Union?
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The responses vary from ―very attached‖ to ―not at all attached.‖ Not at all is coded one and very
attached is coded four. The responses for European Union attachment are subtracted from
national attachment, which produces negative scores for those that have inclusive national
identities and positive scores for those who have exclusive national identities and zero for
neutral. These scores are then coded dichotomously so exclusive identities are one and neutral or
inclusive are zero.
Partisanship
The measure for partisanship comes from a self reported measure for left/right political ideology
using the following question: ―in political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". What
is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a 10-point-scale. On this scale,
where 1 means "left" and 10 means "right," which number best describes your position?‖ Once
again respondents answering I don’t know or those who did not provide an answer are coded as
missing. In order to account for the role of extreme ideologies, this variable will be recoded to
distinguish voters on the fringes. Values of 1, 2, and 3 represent voters on the far left, while 8, 9,
and 10 represent voters on the far right. Each of these values are coded as 1 and the remaining
values as 0. Those respondents who answered ―don’t know‖ or ―no answer‖ are coded as missing
values.
Utilitarianism
Economic Outlook: ―over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation
in this country will be?‖ The responses are coded 1 for worse, 2 for the same, and 3 for better
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Manual: dichotomous coding for identification in a manual labor occupation (1) or not (0)
Education: age when left school in sections:
No full time education =0
15 and under =1
16-19 =2
20+ =3
Still studying =4

Controls in Model for Voting
Trust
The measure of trust is constructed using an index of responses to the following question:
―Please tell me on a score of one through ten how much you personally trust each of these
institutions. A response of one indicates that the respondent does not trust an institution at all,
and a response of ten indicates that they have complete trust:‖
Country parliament?
The European Parliament?
The (Country) Government?
The European Commission?
The Council of Ministers?
The total score has a value between five for no trust at all and fifty for very trusting. Answers
that are coded as ―do not know‖ will be coded as missing values. This measure is the standard
used in previous studies seeking to gauge political trust (McLaren 2007).
National Identity
In order to measure national identity, the following question is used to code those respondents
with exclusive national identity: ―Do you ever think of yourself not as a (country) citizen but also
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as a citizen of the European Union?‖ Responses include often, sometimes, and never. Those
respondents that replied never are considered to have an exclusive identity and are coded 1, the
rest are zero.
Partisanship
The measure for partisanship is a self reported measure for left/right political ideology using the
following question: ―in political matters people talk of "the left" and "the right". What is your
position? Please indicate your views using any number on a 10-point-scale. On this scale, where
1 means "left" and 10 means "right," which number best describes your position?‖ Once again
respondents answering I don’t know or those who did not provide an answer are coded as
missing. In order to account for the role of extreme ideologies, this variable is recoded to
distinguish voters on the fringes. Values of 1, 2, and three represent voters on the far left, while
8, 9, and 10 represent voters on the far right. Each of these values will be coded as 1 and the
remaining values as 0.

Utilitarianism
Economic Outlook: ―over the next 12 months, how do you think the general economic situation
in this country will be?‖ The responses are on a scale of one to five, five being get a lot worse
and one being get a lot better.
Union: dichotomous coding for membership in a union (1) or not (0)
Agriculture: dichotomous coding for work in the agricultural sector (1) or not (0)
Education: age when left school, continuous variable with min 0 and max 74
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Class: ordinal variable with the following values
Working class=1
Lower middle class=2
Middle class=3
Upper middle class=4
Upper class=5
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APPENDIX C: MODELS WITH COUNTRY EFFECTS
Membership Model
Coef.
Std. Err. Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
Knowledge
-0.147
0.009
0.863
0.008
Awareness
-0.140
0.025
0.869
0.022
Trust
0.014
0.008
1.015
0.008
Identity
0.737
0.037
2.090
0.077
Partisanship
0.065
0.032
1.067
0.034
EconOutlook
-0.568
0.022
0.567
0.013
Manual
0.162
0.037
1.176
0.044
Education
-0.309
0.020
0.734
0.014
Belgium
0.414
0.115
1.512
0.174
Denmark
0.685
0.112
1.984
0.223
Greece
0.634
0.112
1.885
0.211
Germany
0.596
0.103
1.814
0.187
Spain
0.086
0.127
1.090
0.139
Finland
1.563
0.105
4.775
0.503
France
0.948
0.109
2.580
0.282
Ireland
-0.257
0.127
0.774
0.098
Italy
1.039
0.116
2.827
0.328
Luxembourg
-0.309
0.176
0.734
0.130
Austria
1.909
0.108
6.748
0.729
Portugal
0.535
0.119
1.708
0.204
Sweden
1.281
0.108
3.599
0.388
UK
1.709
0.104
5.522
0.575
CyprusRepublic
1.029
0.137
2.798
0.385
CzechRepublic
1.333
0.106
3.793
0.401
Estonia
0.510
0.117
1.666
0.195
Hungary
1.418
0.109
4.128
0.449
Latvia
1.466
0.110
4.332
0.476
Lithuania
0.351
0.132
1.420
0.187
Malta
1.090
0.157
2.975
0.467
Poland
0.375
0.129
1.455
0.187
Slovakia
0.851
0.108
2.342
0.253
Slovenia
0.859
0.116
2.360
0.274
Bulgaria
0.606
0.126
1.834
0.230
Romania
0.298
0.135
1.347
0.182

**
**
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
*

*signifies significant at the α=0.05 level **signifies significant at the α=0.01 level
The Netherlands is used as base country for national fixed effects.
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Direction Model
Coef.
Knowledge
Awareness
Trust
Identity
Partisanship
EconOutlook
Manual
Education
Belgium
Denmark
Greece
Germany
Spain
Finland
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Austria
Portugal
Sweden
UK
CyprusRepublic
CzechRepublic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Bulgaria
Romania

-0.120
0.049
-0.040
0.526
0.058
-0.712
0.019
-0.220
-0.052
-0.318
-0.336
0.126
-0.519
0.318
0.002
-0.879
0.125
0.348
0.400
-0.347
-0.089
0.359
-0.585
-0.484
-1.393
-0.500
-0.849
-1.223
-0.772
-1.350
-0.599
-0.703
-1.617
-1.236

Std. Err. Odds Ratio St. Err
0.009
0.887 0.008
0.025
1.050 0.026
0.008
0.961 0.008
0.035
1.692 0.059
0.032
1.060 0.034
0.022
0.491 0.011
0.038
1.019 0.038
0.019
0.803 0.015
0.092
0.949 0.087
0.097
0.728 0.070
0.095
0.715 0.068
0.083
1.134 0.094
0.105
0.595 0.063
0.092
1.374 0.126
0.097
1.002 0.097
0.107
0.415 0.044
0.100
1.134 0.113
0.124
1.417 0.175
0.093
1.492 0.139
0.104
0.707 0.073
0.095
0.915 0.087
0.094
1.433 0.135
0.143
0.557 0.079
0.092
0.616 0.057
0.114
0.248 0.028
0.096
0.607 0.059
0.106
0.428 0.045
0.125
0.294 0.037
0.164
0.462 0.076
0.125
0.259 0.032
0.093
0.549 0.051
0.105
0.495 0.052
0.142
0.198 0.028
0.125
0.291 0.036

**
*
**
**
*
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**
**

*signifies significant at the α=0.05 level **signifies significant at the α=0.01 level
The Netherlands is used as base country for national fixed effects.
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Voting Model
Coef.
Std. Err. Odds Ratio Std. Err.
Awareness
0.057
0.014
1.059
0.015 **
Trust
-0.028
0.003
0.972
0.003 **
Identity
0.160
0.057
1.174
0.066 **
Partisanship
0.156
0.051
1.168
0.060 **
EconOutlook
0.088
0.029
1.092
0.031 **
Union
-0.010
0.054
0.990
0.054
Agriculture
-0.191
0.116
0.826
0.096
Education
-0.012
0.005
0.988
0.005 **
Class
-0.142
0.027
0.868
0.024 **
Austria
-0.383
0.143
0.682
0.098 **
Cyprus
0.147
0.227
1.158
0.262
Finland
0.214
0.139
1.238
0.172
Greece
-4.515
0.294
0.011
0.003 **
Portugal
1.841
0.212
6.303
1.334 **
Germany
1.790
0.161
5.991
0.966 **
Latvia
0.802
0.138
2.231
0.309 **
Poland
-5.281
0.260
0.005
0.001 **
Slovakia
0.723
0.159
2.061
0.328 **
Czech
2.338
0.193
10.356
1.999 **
Estonia
0.730
0.142
2.076
0.295 **
UK
0.378
0.102
1.459
0.149 **
Belgium
-0.463
0.135
0.630
0.085 **
Luxembourg
1.753
0.109
5.774
0.630 **
Ireland
0.124
0.129
1.132
0.146
France
-1.137
0.133
0.321
0.043 **
Slovenia
-6.344
0.470
0.002
0.001 **
Spain
-3.191
0.164
0.041
0.007 **
*signifies significant at the α=0.05 level **signifies significant at the α=0.01 level
The Netherlands is used as base country for national fixed effects.

